The Nour Party saw the Brotherhoods bid for a monopoly over Egyptian Islamism as inconsiderate of the Salafists contributions to Islamists political success throughout the transitional period. Though it had to operate in a hostile political environment, the Brotherhood ultimately fell because of its own political, ideological, and organizational failures. Unlike its counterpart in Turkey, the group lacked experience in bureaucratic administration, and the well-entrenched existing bureaucracy defied the Brotherhoods attempts to exert control over it.5. A conflict between the Brotherhood and the old state was most probably unavoidable in the long run given the historical rivalry between them and the incompatibility of their respective interests and worldviews. Stay connected to Sada with a new smartphone app for Android and iOS devices, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Ideologically, the Brotherhood failed in four key ways. It also endured over three decades of antagonism from the regimes of presidents Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. For the political inclusion of the Brotherhood to lead to the groups democratization, two conditions were necessary. The Brotherhoods education and selection program, which had served to screen members for posts in the organizational apparatus, has therefore contributed to tying rank-and-file members to the rest of the organization. 11 Prominent Islamist ideologue Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi found this development alarming and dangerous.
2 In the months following Mubaraks ouster, the Brotherhood repeatedly confirmed its unwillingness to assume full responsibility over the country since it did not believe it could confront Mubaraks legacy of failure alone. This idea went nowhere, however. Furthermore, the groups elitist hierarchical system of control discouraged grassroots initiatives. Islamist movements will remain key political actors with an ideologically committed constituency and decades of accumulated social capital. The costs of the relentless suppression of a significant social movement such as the Muslim Brotherhood are incredibly high. +9611991591. The organization had developed a great deal since its establishment, but despite its capacity to survive, it lacked the ideological flexibility and creativity to forge its own pathbreaking political model. Instead, it was influenced by Sayyid Qutbs uncompromising resistance to the regime, which ultimately led him to the gallows. Little attention was paid to the role of civil society and communal self-empowerment except as a supplement to the Brotherhoods real goal of taking over the existing political order. The Brotherhoods tenure and overthrow represented the end of the utopian idea that Islam is the solution. Among Islamists and non-Islamists alike, it became evident that Islamic slogans were irrelevant when it came to the Brotherhoods capacity to deliver substantive policy achievements.
Hassan al-Banna himself was assassinated shortly thereafter; many believe his death was at the behest of the government. 2026 1210, 5th flr. Subsequently, the concept evolved into an integral part of the Brotherhoods historical narrative and self-image. This will be the 26th, and nothing will change. Authors interview with a Brotherhood guidance bureau member, July 2013. The regime then widened its persecution and purged other domainspublic services, the military, the judiciary, syndicates, nongovernmental organizations, media outlets, universities, and neighborhoodsto further curb Muslim Brotherhood influence among the middle class and parts of the elite.
The label Qutbist is deceptive when describing the worldview of a religiously and socially conservative Brotherhood leadership that, despite the regimes repression, has publicly called for nonviolent political change. After coming to power, the Brotherhood quickly lost support among the main recipients of its social welfare network: the poor. In addition to attempting to destroy the internal structures of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian regime has also taken its battle into the realm of ideas and ideology. Of course, the regimes restrictions deterred such steps. In times of adversity this vision plays on a notion of perpetual religious struggle that underscores the personal and communal fortitude of true believers in their conflict with the regime. The ideal Brotherhood qualified cadre was the engineer or doctor who could astutely make it to the syndicate board through the provision of services, accumulating popularity and social capital for the group that could win it votes in future parliamentary elections. 27 Though the regimes iron fist disappeared after the 2011 uprising, the Brotherhood did not undertake the necessary process of organizational restructuring to achieve better societal representation and more transparent internal decisionmaking processes. You are leaving the website for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy and entering a website for another of Carnegie's global centers. Historically, the state sidelined the Brotherhood and other Islamist movements, but they nevertheless blossomed in the vacuum created by the states socioeconomic ineptitude. That ensured that the Brotherhoods rise to power would represent not a triumph of its unique brand of Islamism but rather a political ascent resulting from calculated power politics that could easily turn against the Brothers when conditions changed. As far back as the early 2000s, some minor voices within the group started raising the idea that the Brotherhood in its original form had become obsolete as a result of its own success.
This proved not to be the case for the Muslim Brotherhood, which remained unwilling to undergo necessary ideological and organizational transformations and lacked a favorable political context for democratization. But this proved to be a serious miscalculation.
Historically, Islamic government was checked by other nonstate actors and enjoyed much less disciplinary and regulatory power over the population than the modern state does. However, the training and selection program continues to pay off as it has produced skilled and devoted members. Its unexpected success in 2005 was met with additional restrictions and arrests, and the Brotherhood opted to boycott the 2008 local elections. An armed branch organized in the early 1940s was subsequently linked to a number of violent acts, including bombings and political assassinations, and it appears that the armed element of the group began to escape Hassan al-Bannas control. The Brotherhoods election to the Egyptian parliament and presidency exposed this inconsistency in the eyes of the general public and, more importantly, in the eyes of the Islamist power base. Islamist in orientation, it advocated a return to the Qurn and the Hadith as guidelines for a healthy modern Islamic society. Therefore, despite its reduced activity, the Brotherhood remains, with the help of modern technology, a sizable opposition force to the Sisi regime. This tactical decision ultimately paid off for the old state. The organizational model of the political party that the Brotherhood founded after the 2011 revolution resembled the conservative one employed by Jordanian Islamists.20 The Brothers also lacked a meritocracy in running the government. Facing regime repression, the Brothers sought refuge in their closed organization. 15 Hossam Tammam argued that the ruralization of the Brotherhood was fully established by the 1990s. On January 30, 2013, the Nour Party proposed a compromise initiative to reconcile the conflicts between Morsis government and the opposition, but it was rejected by Brotherhood leaders, who saw it as a betrayal by a supposedly Islamist partner. Such an arrangement could also have allowed the Brotherhood to escape the regimes crackdown that happened two years later. The responsibility for implementing these policies, however, was placed on the organizations local units. The two understandings were incongruous, but both implied that the Islamic state was the true representative of Islamic identity and therefore had a vital role to play in the defense and designation of that identity. Second, the Brotherhoods Islamist ideology lacked sophistication and substance, and the organization failed to construct an authentic, nuanced vision for its Islamic project. Third, the groups claims to Islamic legitimacy were in contrast to specific policy decisions its leaders made, creating a gap between the groups ideology and its performance in a leadership role. Instead of critically understanding how and why things went wrong, addressing the roots of previous problems, and embarking on fresh, new paths, the Brotherhood resorted to a policy of escapism. Brotherhood leaders did not necessarily advocate violence or engage often in outright hate speech, but the discriminatory tone of their rhetoric was unmistakable. The organization has thus revealed an astonishing capacity to continue functioning despite regime efforts to prevent this. The Islamist ideology effectively discriminated against women, non-Muslims, and anyone who was not an Islamist. The Brotherhood failed to make its way to power through an ideological triumph or as the outcome of the societal process of Islamization that its leaders promised. Compounding the problem of the Brotherhoods willingness to sacrifice its ideology for political gain was the fact that the ideology itself lacked depth. The organizations inclusion in the political system did not lead to its democratization and moderation, as some observers had predicted it would. Some of those arrested were put in solitary confinement or suffered other abuses, in violation of internationally accepted prison standards. Also significant were the Brotherhoods deluded belief in the power of its massive comparative advantage and encouragement from the old state itself, which preferred to negotiate with conservative and organized actors like the Brothers. It was easy for the Brotherhood, while in opposition, to disseminate general principles that could garner public support on religious and cultural bases. They were also aware that other political groups and movements were instrumental in mobilizing demonstrators and writing the narrative of the uprising. Their frightening theocratic discourse raised serious concerns among many Egyptians that radical democratic politics aimed at dismantling the old state could pave the way for a takeover by sectarian, intolerant, and reactionary Islamists. Nevertheless, for a long time, the Brotherhood managed to mute the impact of these internal conflicts using three main tools. 8 The Salafists of the Nour Party, whom secularists would hardly have described as anti-Islamist, were frustrated by what they saw as the purposefully weak representation of their party in Morsis cabinet and its exclusion from decisionmaking in general. There are four main structural reasons why the Muslim Brotherhood has survived.
In Sudan, Islamists were highly pragmatic. The move worked in the short run, but it cost the Brotherhood long-term credibility. 9 European Christian democratic parties are somewhere in between liberals, socialists, and conservatives. Nevertheless, it was the Brotherhoods responsibility, given its sheer power, to either lead the Islamists toward the acceptance of ideological concessions or opt for a gradualist approach instead of rapidly seeking political domination. Its hierarchical, sect-like organization led the Brotherhood to prioritize loyalty over competence and unity over diversity, and to employ religion in a polarizing way to win political battles.
To this end, any serious intellectual effort to strengthen the Brotherhoods ideological consistency was intentionally avoided. Practically speaking, an Egyptian version of Khomeinism had no real chance of success. Hosni Mubaraks administration to restrict voting in the groups strongholds.
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